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use#LAASteven Soderbergh's Trac is a remarkable lm that takes an in-depth look at the \war on drugs" in
the United States, and does so in a way that is meant to \provoke and upset nearly everyone who sees
it."1Indeed, rarely in the Hollywood system does a lm as controversial as Trac get made, and rarer still
is such a thought-provoking, politically-charged lm a commercial success. Yet Trac has been nominated
for ve Golden Globe Awards, and for ve Academy Awards, including a nomination for best picture of the
year.2The lm has also grossed more than seventy-ve million dollars in the rst eight weeks of its release.3
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to examine the merits of the lm from a cinematic perspective,
nor from an economic one. The purpose of this paper is not to examine and address the performances of the
actors, nor is it to critique the work of the director, Steven Soderbergh, or the screenwriter, Stephen Gaghan.
The purpose of this paper is, rather, to examine the issues the lm raises and to highlight the truths in the
story lines that are used to create those issues. In doing so, this paper seeks to enrich the stories already
present in the lm by providing those stories with other \real-world" voices from those ghting the war on
drugs. In this way, this paper endeavors to create a more complete view of the world Trac creates, and
thereby to facilitate further discussion about the United States' policy on the drug war. Indeed, Trac has
such a palpable eect on those who see it, that further discussion of its themes and stories is necessary to
answer the questions the lm causes movie-goers to ask as they exit the theater; \Was that true?" \Can
things really be so bad?"
Frequently in Hollywood lms, stories that depict current events are given the equivalent of a \content
airbrush," as investors and nanciers ensure that the subject matter of the lm is interesting and compelling
enough for audiences to enjoy the lm and for the lm to therefore make a prot. This nancial goal
1Pener, Degen. Details, \Between the Lines: With subtitles and sympathetic drug lords, Steven
Soderbergh's new lm is riskier than scoring a bag at the Justice Department," p. 44, December,
2000.
2See website: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/video/misc/usafilms/traffic/honors.html
3See website: http://www.variety.com/Boxoffice.asp.
1generally comes at the expense of the validity and believability of the lm and its characters. Yet, as this
paper will demonstrate, Trac is a lm that has taken real-life incidents and episodes from the war on drugs
and created a compelling, interesting Hollywood lm that is simultaneously loyal and truthful to the very
world it depicts.
It is important to note that Trac is not a \true story," but it does draw from the experiences of \real
people" who have been involved in the war on drugs, including past drug czars, DEA agents, Mexican law
enforcement ocers, and drug addicts themselves. This element of truth and integrity in the lm's subject
matter thus makes the lm itself a valuable tool in seeking to understand the war on drugs in the United
States and how that war is eecting America's citizens as well as citizens of other nations. As this paper will
evince, the unfortunate response to the questions people are muttering as they leave the theatre are \yes"
and \no." \Yes, a lot of what you saw in that lm was true." And, \No, things are not that bad; they're
worse."
Trac is an intersection of three stories that take place concurrently in the present day. Each story deals
with a dierent, but interrelated area of the drug war, and each story is shot in a dierent color, making the
stories easy to dierentiate and discuss for the purpose of this paper.
The rst story is shot in blue light, and can thus be referred to as the \blue story." The blue story revolves
around the appointment of a new \drug czar," Ohio state Supreme Court Justice Robert Wakeeld|played
by Michael Douglas|and the beginning of his tenure in that high prole position. Complicating matters
for Justice Wakeeld is a very personal family battle with drugs, as his sixteen year-old daughter, Caroline,
becomes immersed in and quickly trapped by a familiar spiraling world of drug use, drug addiction, and
prostitution. What is unusual about Caroline's story is that she is a \straight-A" student and a \National
Merit Finalist,"4though she frequently experiments with illegal drugs that would be found on the Drug
4Gaghan, Stephen. \Trac: The Shooting Script." Newmarket Press: New York, 2000.
2Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Schedule One list.5Caroline also surrounds herself with other young
kids who are similarly involved in using and abusing such substances.
The last United States \drug czar," or United States Drug Policy Chief, was General Barry McCarey. There
are a remarkable number of similarities between McCarey and Wakeeld, as both are men of substantial
accomplishment, intelligence, and clout, yet both men were largely unable to have a signicant impact on
the way in which the war on drugs was fought or on the outcome of that war.
General Barry McCarey was the United States military's youngest and most decorated four-star general.
General McCarey fought in Vietnam and was also a division commander in the Gulf War. McCarey took
over the role of drug czar in 1996, and was the longest-serving person in that position's history.6Despite his
military record and his qualications, however, most would argue that McCarey was wholly ineective in
his ght to win the war on drugs. The General arrived at the position promising to bring a more humane and
eective approach to his job, but little has changed in terms of anti-drug policy since 1996. Law enforcement
still receives two-thirds of the anti-drug budget, and the anti-drug media campaign receives $1 billion of a
reported $19 billion budget.7 These gures support Trac's suggestion that the role of the Drug Czar is
a complicated one, with demands that are often as political and media-driven as they are substantive and
policy-oriented.8As evidence of the pressures of the job of drug czar, the General Accounting Oce reported
in June of 2000 that two-thirds of General McCarey's sta had quit since he took over as head of the
National Drug Control Policy in 1996.9The same GAO report stated that there were seventeen full-time
5See website: http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/schedules/listby sched/index.html
6Allen, Arthur. \Portrait of a Drug Czar." http://www.salon.com/health/feature//08/30/czar/print.html, p.
1, Aug., 2000.
7Id. at p. 2.
8See Gaghan, p. 16, 2000. Note the constant references to Justice Wakeeld needing to get \face time" with the President,
as well as the repeated discussions of press conferences and constituencies.
9Allen, p.1, 2000.
3staers employed simply to plan and coordinate General McCarey's personal schedule of meetings, lunches,
and press conferences|more than the number of people actually employed to work on drug treatment and
prevention in the oce.10Still, funding for treatment of drug addiction grew by over $775 million under
McCarey, even for inmates with drug addictions.11 Despite these glimpses of progress, however, most
political insiders agree that McCarey's tenure as drug czar was ineective and tied-down in bureaucracy
and media posturing.12Such a criticism may well be something that comes with the job, though, not a
reection of McCarey himself. General Landry is the former drug czar in Trac, the man Justice Wakeeld
is replacing. General Landry meets with his successor to oer advice and a story, telling Justice Wakeeld:
When Kruschev was forced out, he sat down and wrote two
letters and handed them to his successor. He said When you
get into a situation you can't get out of, open the rst letter
and you'll be saved. And when you get into another situation
you can't get out of, open the second. Soon enough this guy
found himself in a tight place. So he opened the rst letter.
It said, Blame everything on me. So he blamed the old guy
and it worked like a charm...He got into another situation he
couldn't get out of, so he opened the second letter, which read,
Sit down and write two letters.13
It thus appears that the role of the drug czar is perhaps an impossible one, as the role demands at least the
appearance of progress and positive results while ghting what most within the war feel is an unwinnable
saga.
In addition to the perpetual criticism of the job that is being done by top ocials, this eort, time, and
money spent on the media and on the projection of progress is clearly another impediment to winning the
10Id. at p. 4
11Id. at pp. 6-7.
12Id. at p. 7
13Gaghan, p. 18, 2000.
4war on drugs. President George W. Bush has not appointed a new drug czar, but he is expected to appoint
someone whose policies and attitudes towards drugs and the war on drugs closely mirror those employed
under McCarey's tenure.14It seems unlikely that the same policies and programs will have any new eect on
the war, instead serving only to continue a frustrating and frustrated policy. This policy, and the problems
inherent to it, is explained, reviewed, and criticized by many real-life United States Senators in Trac.
The senators in the lm, such as Barbara Boxer and Orin Hatch, play themselves in a remarkable scene in
which they give their opinions to the newly-appointed drug czar Wakeeld regarding the war on drugs and
what needs to be done. Soderbergh asserts that the scene was entirely improvised, with each Senator giving
honest and heartfelt feelings about the war and its complications.15Perhaps one of the most provocative
comments comes from a Senator dealing with the economics of the drug war. The Senator in the lm tells
Wakeeld:
You're not battling trackers or dealers, but a market, and
the market contains a paradox: if you arrest trackers, you
raise prices, and you also raise prots, which bring more
trackers into the business...the price of coke and heroin has
dropped and purity has increased. All this law enforcement has
achieved is kids can get better stu, cheaper. In economic terms,
you can forget it; this is not a winnable war.16
Michael Douglas spent a great deal of time preparing for the role of Justice Wakeeld by talking with these
very United States Senators. Douglas asserts that his experience taught him:
that with the billions of dollars that our government is
spending to ght this war, the enemy, the drug cartels,
actually have even more nancial resources. I learned that as
14Komarow, Steven. The USA Today. \Netherlands tests its drug tolerance." 9A, Feb. 15, 2001.
15See website: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/video/misc/usafilms/traffic/soderbergh-interview.html.
16Gaghan, pp. 26-27, 2000.
5much as we're talking about corruption on the south of our
borders, that corruption now is a big issue within our borders,
within our agencies. It's something that is of deep concern
because of the money involved. I learned that as much of the
super new technical equipment that we have, that the cartels
even have more and better equipment.17
These words of futility, despair, and exasperation echo throughout each story of the lm, and indeed through-
out most of the accounts of people working and ghting inside the war on drugs. Yet the war wages on.
Complicating matters for Justice Wakeeld are the struggles of his daughter, Caroline Wakeeld, played
by Erika Christensen. As with the truth inherent in the depiction of the drug czar, Trac succeeds in
portraying Caroline with a great deal of validity in her role as a smart, wealthy suburban high school kid
experimenting with and quickly losing control of drugs.
According to a recent study conducted by the \Monitoring the Future" group at the University of Michigan's
Institute for Social Research, drug use among students in grades 8, 11, and 12 has remained steady for most
illegal drugs, and has even risen in the last year for certain \new" drugs. The study concluded that the
use of the ecstasy rose sharply in the year 2000 among the forty-ve thousand students who took part in
the study.18Perhaps even more telling about the frequency and pervasiveness of drug use in high school is
the nding that almost 40% of high school seniors admitted to some use of marijuana in the twelve-month
period prior to the study.19It seems clear that if nearly 40% of high school seniors are using marijuana, it is
not the case that only the \bad" kids can be using drugs. What is entirely more likely from the ndings is
17See website: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/video/misc/usafilms/traffic/douglas-interview.html.
18See website: http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/press.html, Johnston, L.D., O'Malley, P.M., & Bachman, J.G. Na-
tional press release, \Ecstasy use rises sharply among teens in 2000; use of many other drugs stays steady." December 14, 2000.
19Ibid.
6that many so-called \good kids" such as Caroline are using at least marijuana, and potentially other illegal
drugs.
Interestingly, Trac does not judge these young kids for their drug use, choosing instead to make the
more controversial point that some people are able to use drugs recreationally, while others are not. This
philosophy is represented in the lm by Seth's drug use, which does not interfere with his ability to go to
school and do well in his classes, a reaction to the drugs that is drastically dierent from Caroline's reaction
to the same level of drug use. Though Seth introduces Caroline to drugs, he does not immediately understand
that Caroline cannot \handle" her drugs like he can.20Screenwriter Stephen Gaghan asserts that, though
many people do not believe it, certain people are pre-conditioned to become addicts and others are not,
though both may use the same drugs. For Gaghan, the distinction is clearly a biological one, not a problem
with self-control:
For [some of the population]...it's not a lack of will power. It
aects those people dierently. You can have two people side
by side, identical, one person can deal and one person can't, and
if you can't, the pursuit of [drugs] will take you to places that
are simply not logical...you're leaving your comfy, million-dollar
house in your upper-middle class suburb and actively seeking
danger. That's not what most people do, but that is what some
people do... 21
Soderbergh seems to agree with Gaghan's hypothesis, noting that:
Going after the supply is like an ant at the bottom of the
Matterhorn. I think we need to cop to the fact that there are
some people who can do drugs recreationally and some who
can't. And we need to start helping the people who can't. The
desire to alter your state of consciousness is so inherent to humans
20Gaghan, p. 103, 2000.
21Id. at p. xiii.
7that I just don't know how you control that.22
In the lm, Wakeeld asks Mexican drug czar General Arturo Salazar how the Mexican government treats
and helps those who are addicted to drugs. General Salazar replies matter-of-factly, \addicts treat them-
selves...they overdose and then there's one less to worry about."23
There are certainly people in the debate on drugs who believe there is no such thing as a \recreational" drug
user, arguing that drug addicts should not be treated as having a disease, but should instead be forgotten
with the kind of cold indierence expressed by General Salazar. Gaghan's personal experience tells him
dierently. The screenwriter is a former drug addict who grew up in an environment similar to Caroline's
privileged surroundings.24When Caroline is arrested for being high on drugs, she meets with a social worker
who pushes Caroline to recite her own r esum e. It is a r esum e of many children who will go on to Ivy League
schools and prominent positions in society, lled with accomplishments on academic clubs and athletic teams
that match stellar classroom achievement. It is, ironically, the r esum e of Gaghan himself. Gaghan admits:
I had [Caroline] reciting my r esum e exactly, at a time when
I was drinking, every day, and smoking marijuana and taking
cocaine. The only thing I changed is that, in reality, I had also
been on the all-state soccer team in Kentucky. I just had her on
the school volleyball team.25
Gaghan feels that Caroline's story is a signicant part of the war on drugs, as it demonstrates the need to
treat drug abuse and drug addiction in a way that is apart from the callous view of General Salazar. Gaghan
22Pener, p. 44, 2000.
23Gaghan, p. 96, 2000.
24Lyman, Rick. The New York Times. \Gritty Portrayal of the Abyss From a Survivor; The Screenwriter
for `Trac' Says He Drew on His Past." Arts and Cultural Desk, Feb 5, 2001.
25Id.
8asserts:
If there is a message to the movie, I guess it's that drugs
should be considered a health care issue rather than a criminal
issue...the point is that drug addiction can attack anyone, even
a high-achieving private-school student from a solid, middle-class
family in Kentucky. I don't know if drug addiction is genetic. I
don't even know if it's a disease. But I do know one thing: you have
to treat it like a disease. Because if you don't, you die.26
Trac's second story is shot entirely in yellow, and takes place in Tijuana, Mexico. The yellow story follows
the life and work of Javier Rodriguez, a Tijuana police ocer, who is trying to nd his way amidst a sea of
corruption that permeates even the highest levels of the police and military with and for whom he works.
Benicio del Toro plays Javier, a man trapped in a world of corruption funded by drug dealers and trackers
who bribe the very people and organizations that are supposed to be ghting against the proliferation of
illegal drugs throughout Mexico and the United States.
When Javier and his partner and closest friend, Manolo, are recruited by Mexican drug czar Salazar, it
seems as though the two policemen are being given a chance to have a real impact on the drug trade. The
men quickly learn, however, that even Salazar himself is involved in the corruption, as he helps run one of
the two main Mexican drug cartels that smuggles drugs into the United States through Tijuana.
As Manolo succumbs to the nancial allure of the drug cartel's corruption, Manolo quickly nds himself
caught in the middle of a war between Mexico's biggest drug lords. Javier must then play people o one
another in order to save his partner from assassination, and to save himself from the wrath of corrupt ocers
who have neither patience nor respect for an honest cop.
As the lm suggests, the life of honest Mexican policemen is a dicult one, as the ocers must ght to stay
straight and sane while surrounded by a world of money and inuence driven exclusively by drugs. Such
26Id.
9money and luxury is in startling contrast to the world that a straight cop in Tijuana could aord. Benicio
del Toro notes that he spent time preparing for his role by shadowing a policeman in Tijuana, who taught
del Toro:
number one, that there's a lot of good people down there
trying to do the right thing. And number two, that it's very
dicult for a cop to make a comfortable living, you know?
They don't make that much money and...for example,
you have to buy, in Tijuana, as I understand it, you have to
buy your own equipment. As a cop, I have to buy my own gun,
my own bullets. There's a line in the picture where I say, `They
stole our handcus,' which basically means now, from the little
bit of money that I make, I have to buy another set of handcus.27
Indeed, Trac depicts the life of an honest cop in Mexico as a lonely, poor existence with little appreciation
from colleagues or fellow citizens. In addition to this poverty and disrespect in the face of the enormous
wealth that comes only from corruption, there is also unspeakable danger from being honest and straight
in a world that exists on payos and bribes. During a research trip to Mexico, Gaghan remembers being
told that \the life expectancy of an honest cop [in Mexico] is about thirty days."28In real-life Mexican law
enforcement, such corruption thus seems to permeate nearly all levels of the Mexican anti-drug eorts, going
as high as the hierarchy will go.
In February of 1997, General Jose de Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo, Mexico's highest-ranking anti-drug ocial,
was arrested for accepting bribes and protecting a high-level Mexican drug tracker. The incidents occurred
just ten weeks after the general was appointed director of the National Institute to Combat Drugs (INCD),
27See website: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/video/misc/usafilms/traffic/del-toro-interview.html.
28Gaghan, p. x, 2000.
10the Mexican equivalent to the United States' DEA.29Most embarrassing, perhaps, was the complete trust
and faith that the United States had in Gutierrez and in his reputation as an honest and incorruptible man.
Prior to the scandal, then-drug czar General McCarey called Gutierrez \an honest man," and a \guy of
absolute unquestioned integrity."30 As Trac suggests, there is a great deal of trust between the DEA and
their Mexican counterparts. In the lm, Wakeeld visits with Salazar and expresses his supreme trust in him
and in their ability to work together to ght against the drug trade. Wakeeld tells Salazar that he'd like to
bring Salazar up to Washington, \walk [you] around our side of things, and share some of the information
we've been able to develop on [your] cartels."31One can imagine a similar conversation occurring between
McCarey and Gutierrez, as the two men shared what each knew of the others' operation.
Also problematic, and an outgrowth of this blind trust, is the sharing of information between the government
agencies of the two countries. In the lm, the DEA agents seek out Javier and try to persuade him to provide
them with information about the Mexican cartels in Tijuana. Such information swapping is an apparently
common and reciprocal practice between Mexican and United States agencies and ocials. The United
States gave real-life Mexican drug czar Gutierrez access to United States intelligence regarding anti-drug
investigations, wiretaps, interdiction programs and the names of informants, all of which the corrupt General
presumably used to ght against the United States' anti-drug eorts in the General's position of aiding
Mexican cartels.32Given such poor intelligence and clear errors in judgment, resulting in the giving of vital
ghting strategy and information to the enemy, it not only seems believable, but likely that DEA agents are
29Preston, Julia. The New York Times. \A General in Mexico's Drug War Is Dismissed on Narcotics
Charges." A1, February 19, 1997.
30See website: http://www.ndsn.org/MARAPR97/DRUGCZAR.html.
31Gaghan, p. 95, 2000.
32Preston, Julie. The New York Times. \Mexico's Jailed Anti-Drug Chief Had Complete Briengs in
U.S." A1, February 20, 1997.
11kidnapped and killed by corrupt Mexican police and military ocers.33Ironically, Gutierrez's appointment
was part of a strategy to ght rampant corruption among the Mexican police by expanding the role of the
Mexican military in the drug war. The incident with Gutierrez is thus further evidence that the amount of
money and power involved in corrupting ocers and ocials means that no one is immune to its allure.34
Soderbergh himself, after spending a good deal of time researching the lm in its actual locations, feels that
the corruption depicted in Tijuana really is as pervasive as it seems in the lm. He asserts:
Well, when you get into this issue specically, yeah, there's
a lot of systemic corruption that will be dicult to rule out,
although I think the incoming president in Mexico is very
committed to trying to eect some changes there. But it's
because of the enormous amounts of money involved that
they are the conduit. The demand is over here, and they are
the conduit for all of these drugs to move across. And so
when you're talking about, you know, a lot of people who
don't have a lot of money and then you bring in very powerful
cartels who have a lot of money, you can't be surprised that
some people get caught up in it.35
It is also signicant to note that Gutierrez was not the only Mexican general to be charged with drug war
corruption. Only months after Gutierrez's arrest in 1997, Mexican Army Brigadier General Alfredo Navarro
Lara was arrested on charges that he oered Tijuana's top anti-drug ocial, General Jose Luis Chavez
Garcia, a million dollars to allow drugs to pass through Tijuana on its way to Southern California.36That
the DEA is working in this environment, not knowing who to trust or who is the real enemy, may be one of
33See infra on Mexican DEA agent Kiki Camarena.
34Preston, Julie. The New York Times. \Mexican Use of Army to Fight Drugs Worries U.S." A6,
February 22, 1997.
35See website: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/video/misc/usafilms/traffic/soderbergh-interview.html.
36Preston, Julia. The New York Times. \Another Mexican General Is Arrested and Charged With Links
to Drug Cartel." A8, March 18, 1997.
12the reasons the war on drugs is so often compared to the war in Vietnam.37 One of the more startling tales
of Mexican police corruption and a lack of United States intelligence about such duplicity is the story of
DEA agent Kiki Camarena. In the late 1980s, Jack Lawn became acting administrator of the DEA just as
Kiki Camarena was kidnapped and murdered in Mexico. The United States knew neither the details of the
event nor the culprits, believing only that Mexican anti-drug ocials with whom Camarena was supposed
to be collaborating and cooperating were involved in planning and carrying out the murder. Lawn himself
discussed the importance of being able to trust Mexican anti-drug ocials, saying:
in what we do for a living, we depend on our law-enforcement
counterparts. In the case of Kiki Camarena, that mutual trust
failed. It is very important to note that of the individuals
in this [Kiki Camarena] indictment, three are former police
ocers in Mexico.38
The life of a DEA agent is a fascinating, though often painful one, and it is the third and nal story in
Trac.
Trac's \orange story" occurs in La Jolla, California, a wealthy suburb of San Diego. The story follows the
lives of two DEA agents, Montel Gordon and Ray Castro, as they protect Eduardo Ruiz, the sole witness
who can testify against jailed cocaine importer Carlos Ayala. The agents are also engaged in tracking the
actions of Helena Ayala, Carlos Ayala's socialite wife who, before her husband's arrest, enjoyed the fruits of
her husband's illegal activities without having any knowledge or understanding of those aairs.
When the DEA arrests her husband, Helena Ayala decides to run her husband's cocaine-importing business
37Shannon, Elaine. Desperados: Latin Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and The War America Can't Win. Viking Press: New
York, 1988, p. 453.
38Id. at 445.
13so that she can continue to live the life to which she had grown accustomed. In a telling scene that reveals the
appeal and power of the remarkable amounts of money and luxury the drug trade aords, Helena promises
her husband that she will do whatever it takes to ensure that her unborn child does not have to grow up in
the same poverty that she did.39Helena then has to assume her new role under the watchful eye of Agents
Gordon and Castro, a role that not only makes her a drug importer, but the accomplice to the murder of
Eduardo Ruiz as well.
The story of the DEA agents in the lm is perhaps the most compelling, as it is the stitch that holds all
three of the stories together. Indeed, the DEA is involved in the lives of the Mexican police in Tijuana, in
trying to nd who is corrupt and who can be trusted to aid in the ght against the drug trade. The DEA
is also involved in the life of the new drug czar, in teaching him and bringing him up-to-speed about the
current victories, losses, and diculties in ghting the cartels abroad and the drug problem at home. The
life of a DEA agent is perhaps the most disturbing portrayal in the lm, as the agents are shown ghting a
war with poor, often erroneous information, against ruthless soldiers and businessmen who have more money
and technology to ght the war with more success and eciency. Even Eduardo Ruiz realizes the futility of
what the DEA is trying to do, as is apparent when he tells Agent Gordon, after Gordon's partner is killed
in a botched attempt on Ruiz's life:
Can't you for a second imagine none of this had happened?
That my drugs had gone through. What would have been the
harm? A few people get high who are getting high anyway.
Your partner is still alive...Don't you see this means nothing?
That your whole life is pointless? You only got to me because
your were tipped o by the [competing cartel], who's trying to
break into Tijuana. You're helping them. You work for a drug
dealer too... 40
39Gaghan, p. 91, 2000.
40Id. at 135.
14This sense of hopelessness and futility is perhaps best addressed by a government ocial immersed in the
battle. Gaghan recalls a conversation he had with the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Counter-Terrorism
and Narcotics. Gaghan asked the Deputy Secretary if it were true that it was \common knowledge" sixty
percent of all the drugs coming into the United States were coming in through Mexico, and yet they still
could not be stopped. The Deputy Secretary told Gaghan:
Yeah, well, what do you want me to do? You want me to do
nothing and watch it go to seventy percent? Or do you want me
to work a hundred hours a week and maybe I can get it down to
fty percent?41
In order to understand these problems with the DEA, is it valuable to examine the history of the adminis-
tration. The Drug Enforcement Administration was created by President Nixon in 1973 as the chief drug
enforcement agency of the federal government.42The roots of the agency can be traced back to the 1930s,
though, when the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was formed under the jurisdiction of the Department
of the Treasury. In 1968, President Johnson merged the FBN with the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA) Bureau of Drug Abuse Control under the Department of Justice, creating the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD). President Nixon then created the DEA in an eort to further consolidate
United States drug enforcement in one agency that would be controlled by the White House through the
Attorney General.43This history is signicant, as so many dierent agencies often nd themselves competing
for the media attention and respect that will ensure their budgets are renewed and increased each year by
Congress.44 The DEA's ocial mission is to \mobilize, by arrest and prosecution, major drug violators of the
41Gaghan, p. viii, 2000.
42Wisotsky, Steven. Beyond the War on Drugs: Overcoming a Failed Public Policy. Prometheus Books:
Bualo, New York, 1990, p. 65.
43Id. at 66.
44See Deep Cover, infra.
15Controlled Substances Act operating at interstate and international levels."45Section 812 of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) lists substances that were controlled in 1970 when the Act was passed.46The CSA
denes a \controlled substance" as a \drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule
I, II, III, IV, or V."47Since the passage of the CSA, over one hundred sixty substances have been added to
the list, which can currently be found in x1308 of Title 21 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1300.48
The CSA is thus central to the work of the DEA, as agents generally prosecute suspects under provisions
of the Act. The most commonly charged oenses include \unlawful distribution, possession with intent
to distribute, and attempt or conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and related import/export
oenses."49Signicantly, drug law thus can be viewed as political in the sense that the Attorney General,
rather than the Surgeon General or the FDA, determines the classications of certain drugs.50The impor-
tance of this politicization of the drug law is felt in everything from the diculty in legalizing marijuana for
medicinal purposes, to the punishment of drug users regardless of the frequency of their oense or even the
particular drug they are using (many states treat oenses for marijuana and cocaine equally).51 The life of
a DEA agent is chronicled with remarkable clarity and honesty in two accounts that support much of the
life portrayed by the agents in Trac. The rst is Elaine Shannon's account of the disappearance, murder,
and subsequent bumbled investigation of DEA agent Enrique \Kiki" Camarena.52The second account is
45United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration: A Prole, p. 4, 1981.
4621 U.S.C x801 et. seq.
47Id. at x802(6).
48Id. at x1308.
49Wisotsky, p. 67, 1990.
50Id. at 67.
51Id. at 67.
52Shannon, 1988.
16Deep Cover, a book written by former DEA agent Michael Levine about his experiences working undercover
in an eort to inltrate and destroy the largest cocaine-manufacturing business in the world, Bolivia's La
Corporaci on.53
In February, 1985, DEA agent in Mexico Kiki Camarena disappeared in Guadalajara, kidnapped in broad
daylight almost directly in front of the American consulate.54In 1988, after years of the Mexican government
stalling its own investigation and attempting to cover-up the corruption and involvement of its own men in the
murder, Bill Coonce was appointed head of a task force investigating Camarena's abduction and murder.55To
do this day, no one knows the truth about what happened to Camarena. The Mexican government found
audio tapes of Camarena being tortured after his kidnapping, though they refused to allow the United States
to analyze the tapes for voice identication.56 At the end of 1988, the United States nally indicted ve men
for the murder of Camarena, three of whom were high-ranking Mexican law enforcement ocials.57Despite
these indictments, and countless varying accounts by both the Mexican and United States governments, it
seems that no one will ever know the truth about Camarena's murder. After years of involvement in the
investigation, Coonce, like many DEA agents, blamed the lack of knowledge on the Mexican government for
\stonewalling," and on the Reagan administration for failing to be strong with the Mexicans in demanding
answers. Coonce asserts
It really lets you know about how the system will eat you up.
53Levine, Michael. Deep Cover: The Inside Story of How DEA Inghting, Incompetence, and Subterfuge
Lost Us the Biggest Battle of the Drug War. Delacorte Press: New York, 1990.
54Shannon, p. 9, 1988.
55Id. at 265.
56Id. at 447.
57Id. at 445.
17Big government will prevent you from doing a job when other
interests are at stake. The life of an agent is secondary to other
issues. No one will say so. You get a lot of lip service, but things
just get undone and you don't get backed. You're told you're
supported, but after a few months of not being able to get a straight
answer from anyone, you look back and realize you've been had.58
Such powerful antipathy for the DEA, and for the United States government's policies on the war on drugs
and the way in which the war is being fought, is also reected in the words and stories of Michael Levine, in
his personal account of life as a DEA agent.
After twenty-ve years of doing undercover work for the DEA, Michael Levine writes:
It is both sobering and painful to realize, having personally
accounted for at least three thousand criminals serving
fteen thousand years in jail, and having seized several tons
of various illegal substances, that my career was meaningless
and had had absolutely no eect whatsoever in the so-called
war on drugs. The war itself is a fraud.59
Levine's book chronicles his undercover work and his ability to make a deal with representatives of La
Corporaci on, an organization of numerous cocaine manufactures who are estimated to handle \more money
in cash each month than the total budgets of the DEA, the FBI, and Customs combined.60Levine negotiated
a deal to buy fteen thousand kilos of cocaine for $75 million, the United States wholesale value of which
at the time was $3.6 billion.61The deal fell through, however, in a startling display of incompetence and
ignorance by the United States government, the DEA, and the national media.
58Id. at 452.
59Levine, p. 12, 1990.
60Id. at 109.
61Id. at 68.
18As Levine began to negotiate with the Bolivians, he inquired about the diculties that would arise in
bringing a plane into Bolivia to pick up his drugs. The Bolivian way of doing business requires all buyers to
come to them, rather than meeting in a neutral location to swap drugs for money. At the time of Levine's
negotiation, Operation Snowcap was the DEA's largest anti-drug program in South America.62Snowcap was
funded with millions of dollars, as well as with DEA agents who were sent to the jungles of South America
to y \Ramboesque, low-ying missions, to try and nd jungle cocaine labs."63Levine asked the Bolivians
about Operation Snowcap, and about the many DEA agents working with Bolivian law enforcement to ght
the drug trade. The Bolivian drug dealers \laughed politely," telling the undercover Levine:
they pose no threat. The very people assigned to the gringos
report to us. They give us three days' notice before they y
a mission. My organization controls all civil aeronautics in
Bolivia. There is absolutely no interference from law
enforcement...[The Americans] have a few helicopters. They
go up, and they go down. That is all they do. They do nothing.
We control them. Please do not be oended, but Americans are
such simple people.64
As evidence that this was not mere pung by anxious businessmen, Levine himself noted that he had been
told the exact same thing eight years earlier by yet another Bolivian drug lord while Levine was on another
undercover assignment. Further validation of this statement from the Bolivians remarkably was given to
Levine by Art Egbert, who was at the time the Sta Coordinator for the DEA. When Levine mentioned
what the Bolivians had said about the (lack of) eectiveness of Operation Snowcap, Egbert told Levine that
the DEA knew the program was not eective, but that it was the direction that the agency had decided to
62Id. at 48.
63Id. at 49.
64Id. at 70.
19go and \anyone who does not believe in it does not belong in the agency."65 Egbert subsequently told Levine
that the Bolivians were exactly right in their depiction of the program and its inability to deter the drug trade.
Levine was told that the DEA did not have airplanes that could reach the cocaine labs deep in the jungle
and that the corruption of the law enforcement ocials there was \insurmountable" anyway.66The DEA
sta coordinator terminated the conversation with Levine by telling him that the Bolivian's La Corporaci on
was manufacturing so much cocaine that Levine's undercover deal was not worth doing because it would
not make \any dierence whatsoever" in ghting the war.67All this, according to Levine, was said while
DEA agents were still being sent into the jungles on dangerous missions in search of cocaine labs that the
high-ranking DEA ocials knew could never be found.
As Levine continued trying to arrange a deal with the Bolivians, DEA ocials above him changed their minds
about the operation almost daily, sometimes instructing him to go forward with the deal, other times telling
him to forget the job entirely. Ultimately, Levine arranged to make the deal, but the DEA made incredible
tactical errors during the course of trying to nalize the negotiation. One such error was demanding that the
deal take place in a Marriot hotel, after the Bolivians had explicitly told Levine that only DEA agents stay
at the hotel and that there were agents staying there at the very time the deal was being discussed.68This
glaring and potentially life-threatening error was followed by other blunders, such as placing a lead agent on
the case who dealt with the stress by repeatedly drinking himself into a stupor, and the DEA refusing to put
up the necessary money to allow an undercover Levine to y into the jungle with the Bolivians, see the labs
for himself, and arrest the cocaine manufacturers once he got there. Countless other errors were made that
65Id. at 76.
66Id. at 76.
67Id. at 77.
68Id. at 101.
20hardly seem possible for a U.S. government agency entrusted with such responsibility and power.69 Perhaps
one of the most damning elements of Levine's account is his constant reference to how the \suits" in charge
were spinning all that happened, and were more concerned with the story they could manufacture in the
media rather than the story that was happening in the eld. Ocials were also concerned with ensuring that
the DEA got the credit for any slight drug-war achievement. Indeed, at various points during the operation,
Customs and the DEA both had agents and ocials working on the case. While the Customs and DEA
people were supposed to be cooperating and collaborating, more often than not Levine's account makes the
work seem like a competition, a ght to see which agency could claim credit for the job rst.
This competition caused both agencies to choose any result over the best result, a policy that was almost
certainly behind Customs' decision to send an NBC news camera into Levine's undercover home. The
cameras videotaped the extensive wires and hidden cameras that were being used to catch the Bolivians if
a deal were to take place. Incredibly, the crew actually went into the house without the knowledge of the
DEA agents on the case, and were in the house just moments before Levine arrived there with the Bolivian
dealers.70The news people then ran the footage of the operation before all suspects and related parties could
be apprehended, resulting in the escape of most of the highest-level members of La Corporaci on, including
the chief accountant for the entire organization. Such a stunt by the news media could have meant the lives
of Levine and the other undercover agents, and, as Levine notes incredulously, it was also an indication that:
Customs was giving [the newspeople] actual evidence before
arrests were even made...they had risked agents' lives, ruined
follow-up investigations at the source-country-level, and helped
possibly the biggest link in the South American money-laundering
chain to escape.71
69Id. at 232.
70Id. at 222.
71Id. at 222.
21Yet another problem that Levine highlights throughout his chronicles is the splintering of divisions within the
DEA itself. Levine explains that the DEA was divided into sections or \desks" according to the kind of drug
involved, rather than the desk being assigned to one geographical region where the drugs or organizations
were headquarted. Thus, a desk assigned to cocaine would be tracking and ghting the cocaine war in
South America, Central America, the Middle East, Asia, and everywhere else in the world cocaine was
manufactured and distributed.72 Such a system is obviously inherently inecient, as it does not align itself
with the very people it is purporting to ght. Levine asserts:
Drug dealers don't separate their organizations according to
drug category. A Colombian drug organization might deal in
Quaaludes, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, thus putting them
under the jurisdiction of four separately managed divisions in
DEA headquarters. This means four separately run investigations;
four times the amount of man-hours spent on one target; four
times the amount of paperwork; four times the amount of expenses;
and bureaucratic inghting for control of cases (particularly those
that have the promise of media attention) that is nastier, dirtier, and
more underhanded than a Chicago election.73
This divisiveness is immediately apparent when one examines the DEA website.74 Indeed, the website is
so littered with a description of all of the DEA programs addressing dierent drug trackers and distribu-
tions around the world that one is quickly imbued with the sense that a number of programs were thrown
desperately at the drug problem, without a cohesive plan or a hope for success. The site appears to be an
attempt on the part of the agency to mollify critics, enabling it to say that there is \something addressing"
whatever problem arises in the drug war. The site speaks of \bi-national forces" in the Southwest Border
Initiative (SWBI), but does not address the rampant corruption within the organizations with whom the
72Id. at 78.
73Id. at 78.
74See website: http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/briefingbook/page58-83.html.
22DEA is trying to cooperate. It does not address the kind of corruption that fooled drug czar McCarey
into thinking Mexican drug czar Gutierrez was a trustworthy man, nor of the corruption that led to the
kidnapping and murder of Kiki Camarena. Instead, the site lists the programs the DEA has created to ght
the war on drugs. The website gives a dizzying array of programs and initiatives that includes:

\Foreign Cooperative Investigations"

\State and Local Task Forces"

\Mobile Enforcement Teams"

\Forensic Chemist Training"

\Academy for Drug and Criminal Intelligence"

23\Intelligence Research Specialist Program"

\Cooperative Training"

\Clandestine Laboratory Training"

\Aviation"

\Operations Pipeline and Convoy"

\Diversion Control"

\Demand Reduction Program"

24\Intelligence;"

\High Intensity Drug Tracking Areas" monitoring75
All of the above programs are listed on the website, yet there is not a single word about the problems the
DEA faces with corruption or outmatched resources. This is not to say that these programs are futile or
meaningless. It does seem clear simply from the remarkable number of programs, however, that the potential
for the kind of ineciency, incompetence and delay discussed by many DEA agents like Levine is quite real.
While it is not the only culprit, it does seem probable that at least part of the reason the war on drugs in
not being won, and indeed may not be winnable, is that the DEA is an agency that is not equipped to ght
against its enemy. If the United States' prime drug enforcement's goal is not to win, but to posture for the
media in order to convince Congress to renew and increase the budget for next year, it is not surprising that
the United States is losing its battle against cold, calculating businessmen who will kill and die for their
business.
Still, it seems clear in talking to the ocers and ocials ghting the war that they too are aware of the futility
of their work, yet they are uncertain about a dierent course of action that may prove more successful. It
would be easy, given the negative accounts of the DEA from former agents and insiders, to be overly critical
of the men and women working in the Administration and ghting the war on drugs. Gaghan admits his
script for Trac was originally meant to be a satire of the war on drugs, on how ridiculous and pitiful
the eort was in ghting these all-powerful cartels. Yet, after he met with a number of ocials from the
Pentagon, the Oce of National Drug Control Policy, the Council of Police Chiefs, and policy advisers on
the war on drugs, Gaghan changed his mind. He explains:
25Along the way I decided that I couldn't do a satire...I realized
that everyone I was meeting was so lled with despair,
authentic despair, that they weren't really appropriate targets
for a satire. They weren't cavalier, they didn't think they had the
right answers. Nobody I met said, `We're winning the War on
Drugs.' I was meeting reasonable people who were having a
reasonable response to what they were trying to do. Their goal
was always good: `We don't want to see kids throwing their
lives away on drugs.' I mean, who does? And their response to
their job was exactly what anyone's response would be...
frustrated, overwhelmed. `We're not doing the right thing.
What do we try next?'...Everybody felt awful.76
Such feelings of futility and desperation certainly were echoed by Michael Levine, who was so upset by the
way his undercover mission with the Corporaci on was handled that he thought the only way to make it
worth while was to take copious notes of all that went wrong.77Levine's work does illuminate a great deal
of seeming incompetence on the part of the DEA. It may be the case, however, that it is not incompetence
but rather a lack of comparable resources that has hurt the United States so severely in ghting the war on
drugs.
In 1998, Donnie Marshall, Acting Deputy Administrator of the DEA, addressed the House Government
Reform and Oversight Committee & Subcommittee on National Security, International Aairs, and Criminal
Justice.78Marshall asserted to the committee:
The international drug syndicates operating throughout our
hemisphere are resourceful, adaptable, and extremely powerful.
These syndicates have an unprecedented level of sophistication...
they have
at their disposal an arsenal of technology, weapons
76Gaghan, p. viii, 2000.
77Levine, p. 12, 1990.
78See Congressional Hearings Intelligence and Security website: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998 hr/h980312m.htm
26and allies|corrupting law enforcement and government
ocials|enabling them to dominate the illegal drug market in
ways we never thought possible. These modern-day drug
syndicate leaders oversee a multi-billion dollar cocaine and
heroin industry which aects every aspect of American life.79
An example of this remarkable technology and power is evident in Trac, when Helen Ayala brings a doll
to the Mexican drug lord, promising him a new way of smuggling cocaine. The drug kingpin looks at the
doll with contempt, noting that drugs have been smuggled in children's toys for years. Helen smiles, telling
the man, \the doll is cocaine."80Such innovative business techniques are to be expected of an industry that
is estimated to gross $60 billion a year in the US alone, ranking it in the top ten largest businesses in the
United States.81In ghting this business, prices have fallen, purity has increased, and the United States now
incarcerates the largest proportion of its population of any country in the world|many for relatively minor
drug oenses.82
In an article for salon.com, Je Stark calls Trac \the rst mainstream, Hollywood production that has
come out and said that America's drug war is not winnable."83This paper has sought to demonstrate that
Trac is an important lm because it depicts the drug war with remarkable truth and integrity, taking
its stories and themes from real-world events and experiences of those ghting this war from the trenches.
Trac is a lm that demands and deserves more than just an Oscar nomination or a nod for best picture of
79Id. at p. 1.
80Gaghan, p. 117, 2000.
81\Treatment & Education vs. Prohibition & Punishment." Transcript of PBS symposium on Drug wars. See website:
http://www.pbs.org/wghb/page...ntline/shows/drugs/symposium/panel1.html.
82Id. at p. 5.
83Stark, Je. \Hollywood Kicks the Habit." http://www.salon.com/ent/mo...ture/2000/12/20/traffic essay
27the year. Trac is a lm that demands and deserves discussion from those inside and outside the war. It is
a lm that demands and deserves an honest debate about the state of our drug policy, about its successes
and failures, and what can be done to alter the feelings of despair and futility that permeate through nearly
all levels and individuals in the middle of the war. This paper has sought to facilitate such a discussion by
demonstrating that Trac is more than a collection of overly dramatized horror stories of life in the war on
drugs. Indeed, Trac is so much more that to ignore it and the truth in its representation of our failures in
this war is to repeat past mistakes while DEA agents, politicians, and drug addicts give their lives ghting
or dying from drugs.
28